Introduction
It is a familiar fact that the four categorical statements a. "Every F is/is not G" b. "Some F is/is not G" may be used to 'decorate' the vertices of the Square of Opposition, while each statement contradicts the statement written in the opposite vertex, so the Square's diagonals represent the relation of contradictoriness.
1
On 1 I will use the term "categorical statements" for their logical analyses as well.
the modern reading of the Square, however, its edges do not represent the relation of subalternation, contrariety and subcontrariety, as on the traditional reading by Aristotle [1] and his followers. Since subalternation is an inverse of immediate entailment, and contrariety and subcontrariety are certain weak forms of contradictoriness, there is a good reason for investigating as to why the relations are not preserved in the modern reading when they had been admitted for more than two millennia.
2
In this paper I zoom in on the role of existential import, which is known as the source of invalidity of subalternation, contrariety and subcontrariety.
I will tune up categorical statements within an expressively rich higher-order partial type logic and confirm the construal of modern logic as regards their existential import (i.e., that universal categorical statements lack existential import, whereas particular categorical statements have it). I will precisely define the notion of existential import and restate the familiar of subalternation, contrariety and subcontrariety on modern reading of the Square.
From the categorical statements a. and b. one can easily construct four modal (de dicto) categorical statements a.
′ "Necessarily, every F is/is not G" b.
′ "Possibly, some F is/is not G".
Immediately, an important question arises: Do they lack existential import?
I answer in the affirmative for a.
′ , but in the negative for b.
′
. So-called void properties, which are barely conceived, since they cannot have an instance and so they appear to be 'non-properties', are the sole cause of the existential import of b.
′ -type modal categorical statements. Consequently, subalternation, and thus also contrariety and subcontrariety, do not generally hold in the corresponding 'modal' Square of Opposition.
The four modal categorical statements articulate the necessity or contingency of property possession. Such properties are traditionally called essential or accidental, in agreement with the mode they pertain to their bearers. By adding two comparable kinds of properties, one completes a quadruple of such properties, and determine the relation of such quadruple to the 'modal' Square of Opposition.
A tighter kinship can be ascertained in the case of statements about requisite and potential properties a.
′′
"The property G is/is not a requisite of the property F " b.
"The property G is/is not a potentiality of the property F " which are logically equivalent to modal categorical statements a. ′ and b. ′ , respectively. These statements can be considered as explicit renderings of statements such as "Horses are animals" when they are understood as analytic, i.e., necessarily true or necessarily false.
My investigations will utilize Kuchyňka's (yet unpublished) variant of Tichý's Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) which is called Transparent Hyperintensional Logic (THL). THL, as well as TIL, is a many-sorted higher-order logic, a type theory. Rivalling Montague's well-known [20] approach, the most important applications of TIL  which are usually translatable to THL  are in the semantics of natural language (propositional attitudes, subjunctive conditionals, verb tenses, etc); cf. esp. [41, 42, 11, 34] .
There are several reasons for adopting THL. Firstly, it is a rather extensive and versatile framework which is even capable of explicating hyperintensional phenomena of our conceptual scheme. The system naturally covers quantified modal logic, while it enables higher-order quantification over properties and relations, which is needed for my investigation as well. Another important reason is THL's accommodation of partiality, which is required for precise definition of existential import. 3 The structure of the paper is as follows. After the exposition of THL's key notions in Section 2, I will offer THL's analysis of categorical statements and their main relations in Section 3. The definition of existential import occurs in Section 3.2. Modal categorical statements are proposed in Section 4.1, where I will also define the notions of requisite and potentiality. An examination of relations of modal categorical statements is provided separately in Section 4. In Section 5, I will summarize my results and give some hints for future work.
Key notions of Transparent hyperintensional logic

Constructions as hyperintensions
THL resembles the typed λ-calculus because its language L uses terms such as
The crucial idea of Tichý's approach to logic is to understand the terms as linguistic devices directly representing so-called constructions. Constructions are structured abstract entities. They are (not necessarily effective) algorithmic computations which typically yield common set-theoretical objects (cf. [40, 41] for careful description and defence of the notion). Postulating constructions as genuine entities enables us to model meanings as language-independent, fine-grained entities, as hyperintensions (cf., e.g., the seminal paper by Cresswell [9] for the notion of hyperintensionality). Meaning is thus an algorithm that computes an expression's denotatum  an idea that has been recently elaborated also by Moschovakis [21] and Muskens [23] .
For a straightforward reason for the adoption of hyperintensions consider e.g. the argument having the premise "A believes that 8 = 8" from which it is surely invalid to infer "A believes that 8 = √ 64". However, since standard possible world semantics (PWS) (some say: intensional semantics) is incapable of discriminating between different meanings of logically equivalent expressions, the agent is modelled as believing an unstructured proposition that is true in all possible worlds; the sentences thus report the same state of affairs and the argument is therefore wrongly evaluated as valid. A move from PWS intensions to sentences (or even formulas) as objects of beliefs can be easily rejected by Church's familiar translation argument which shows that the agent's beliefs cannot be correctly modelled as attitudes towards pieces of particular notation. Tichý's constructions present a reasonable balance between the two mentioned extremes: meanings are modelled as structured constructions of expressions' denotata (such as PWS propositions), and the argument above is rightly evaluated as invalid. Dependently on a valuation ('assignement') v (cf. the next paragraph for its specification), constructions v-construct objects. Objects are denotational values of L's terms, so the semantics for L has both algorithmic and denotational levels: L's terms stand for constructions, while they denote the objects v-constructed by the constructions. It holds that every object is v-constructed by infinitely many v-congruent (logically equivalent if v-congruent on any v), but non-identical constructions. For example, the number eight is v-constructed by e.g. multiplying four by two or by the square root of sixty four, which are two distinct, yet v-congruent constructions of the number.
Using a common metalanguage five kinds of constructions can be described. Let • ξ (i) (for 1 i m) be any type, i.e., a set of objects of the same kind (cf. Section 2.2 for more details) that will be called ξ (i) -objects, • v be any valuation, i.e., a function that supplies each variable of L with a certain value from the field which consists of infinite sequences s ξ of ξ-objects for each particular ξ, • X (i) be any construction or non-construction, • x be a variable for constructions or non-constructions, • C (i) be any construction, • c be a variable for constructions, • f be a variable for functions (as mappings),
" can be read as "given M and v, C v-constructs" or, alternatively, as "given M and v, the denotational value of the term "C" is". Y " can be a string of letters of Greek alphabet, are simple symbols, while " Y " codes certain useful additional information about X. On the other hand, where w is a possible world variable, "[C w]" will be abbreviated to "C w ". " 0 " will be usually suppressed in records of trivializations of non-constructions; in some cases, upright boldface compensates for the suppressed " 0 ". For reasons of simplicity, I will sometimes loosely speak about the trivialization of some logical entity as the logical entity as such. Variables (but not meta-variables) will always be written as small italicized Latin letters. Constructions of well-known binary logical or mathematical operations will be written in the infix manner. Provided no confusion arises, pairs of brackets will be omitted; for a typical ex-
variables
. Below, round brackets delimiting certain propositional constructions will be introduced with a special meaning.
Type theory
THL utilizes an instance of Tichý's type theory which is a substantial modification of Church's simple theory of types [5] . As in other type theories, the essential part of a frame is the so-called base B. 
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The hierarchy of types is defined inductively as follows (the definition is adopted from [41] ). Recall that types are directly understood as sets. Ramification excludes circular specification of constructions.
Let base B consist of any pairwise disjoint sets of primitive objects. 
Nothing is a type of order 1 over B unless it so follows from (t 1 i) and (t 1 ii).
Let ξ be any type of order n over B. 
n-order constructions
Nothing is a construction of order n over B unless it so follows from (c n i) and (c n ii).
Let * n be the collection of constructions of order n over B.
(n + 1)-order types
The type * n is a type of order (n + 1) over B. Every type of order n is a type of order (n + 1) over B.
. . , ξ m are types of order (n + 1) over B, then the collection (ξξ 1 . . . ξ m ) of all m-ary total and partial functions from ξ 1 × · · · × ξ m to ξ is also a type of order (n + 1) over B.
Nothing is a type of order (n + 1) over B unless it so follows from (t n+1 i) and (t n+1 ii).
Then, a frame for THL is a tuple 
, where I is an interpretation function which maps each term "X" (unabbreviated: " 0 X") to the designated object X (if any) which is a member of a (typically) 1st-order type over B THL .
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For the logical analysis of natural language expressions by means of THL one utilizes both extensions and intensions over B THL , while their constructions serve as hyperintensional models of expressions' meanings. Intensions involve total or partial functions from possible worlds, i.e., objects of type (ξω), which will be abbreviated in notation to "ξ ω ". The type o ω will be abbreviated in notation to "π". Important kinds of intensions include • propositions, i.e., objects of type π, • ξ-properties (i.e., properties of ξ-objects), i.e., objects of type (πξ),
e., objects of type ξ ω . Properties and m-ary relations are thus in fact identified with monadic and m-adic conditions. Conditions are proposition-like entities: the fact that an entity X (or an m-tuple of entities) satisfies / counter-satisfies condition F in world W matches the fact that the corresponding proposition 'X is F ' holds / does not hold in W . 5 For example, let I("T") = T, where T is a member of a 1st-order type o (according to the notational agreement from the preceding section, "T" on the left-hand side of = is " 0 T"; similarly below). Further, let I("
, not what it v-constructs), since I emulates our systematic construction of the language.
At least brief motivation for THL (due to Kuchyňka, p.c.) may be useful here. According to THL, "Fido is a dog" says that Fido satisfies the condition be a dog; and predication consists just in that. However, Montague and then Tichý (cf. e.g. [17] ) were comfortable with a different picture of predication and verification. To ascertain the truth of an ordinary sentence such as "Fido is a dog" one inspects whether Fido belongs to the set of all actual dogs (this extension of the property be a dog in a given W is nothing but a bisection of the domain); and predication relates Fido to that set. This picture makes good sense in a model theory which deploys set-theoretic considerations, yet it is highly unrealistic in the context of use of a natural language in which one never verifies the sentence by investigating the whole world to ascertain which individuals are dogs in it and then checks for Fido's membership in that set. That THL presents a more natural stance towards natural language is clearly visible when one compares advanced topics of analysis of natural language such as tenses or verb aspects, where TIL becomes rather heavy-handed. Such a comparision cannot be made here, however. At the moment, the greatest argument in favour of THL instead of TIL is the brevity of its analyses, the better readability of formulas and overall logical convenience. To illustrate, the TIL counterpart of the THL modal universal positive categorical statement
(assuming the same abbreviating conventions).
Below are types for 'constants' (i.e., trivializations), variables and even 'metavariables' which will often be the subject of discussion later. The intensional and extensional operators are defined below. Let "should v-construct an object of type" be abbreviated to "/" and "C 1 /ξ; C 2 /ξ" be abbreviated to "C 1 , C 2 /ξ".
Intensions are chosen as the denotata of expressions whose reference varies across logical space, e.g. "the U.S. president", "It rains in Paris". For a simple example of logical analysis by means of THL consider the following sentences and the propositional constructions (i.e., constructions of π-objects) expressed by them: "Max is a dog" trivialization of the operation of necessity / possibility ∧, → /(πππ) trivialization of the intensional conjunction / conditional ∀, ∃/(π(πι)) trivialization of the intensional universal / existential 'quantifier' * The superscript " ξ " by "Π" or "Σ" will be suppressed because particular values of ξ can be easily gathered from surrounding context. v-constructed by [Dog M]; this blocks the undesirable substitution that creates the hyperintensionality puzzle discussed in Section 2.1.
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For his simple type theory Tichý [39] proposed a system of natural deduction in Gentzen style, 8 which has been extended for its ramified version in [34] . Since it is based on type theory, the system makes heavy use of substitution and α-, β-, η-reductions. Further main rules characterize the 'semantics' of kinds of constructions, and some other rules characterize the behaviour of logical as well as non-logical 'constants'. The deduction system cannot be reproduced here for reasons of brevity. Below, I consider definitions to be certain derivation rules of form C 1 ⇔ C 2 , where C 1 and C 2 are two v-congruent (even logically equivalent) propositional constructions which are therefore interderivable. 9 The interderivability of v-congruent constructions of truth values, "⇔ o ", is also employed.
Below are rules that specify meanings of our main non-primitive extensional and intensional operators in a type/proof-theoretic style, while the definiens even shows how to calculate their denotational values (the meanings of primitive operators T, ∼, &, = ξ are given by I).
The interdefinability of Π with Σ and with ♦ needs a separate treatment: see the next section.
Determinate truth
It is a well-recognized fact that the adoption of partiality is useful for the analysis of our conceptual scheme (cf. e.g. [12] ). And it is of especial importance for our topic: statements deploying properties denoted by empty terms (incl. empty predicates) are often gappy, i.e., without a truth-value in a given world W . Such statements thus typically have existential import, which I will discuss in detail in Section 3.2.
As an example of a gappy sentence consider B 1 : "The King of France is bald"
9 Such an understanding of definitions is studied within proof-theoretic framework (cf. e.g. [36] ). 10 For discussion of contemporary type theories from the viewpoint of modeltheoretic/proof-theoretic distinction see e.g. [19, 14] . the negation of which B 2 : "The King of France is not bald" is also without a truth-value in W . As famously argued by Strawson [37] , "the King of France" is an empty term and so the common existential presupposition of the sentences, viz. that the King of France exists, is not satisfied.
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To deny the sentence B 1 in such a way that our resulting statement is determinately true (not without a true value), one should use the sentence B 2
′ : "It is not true that the King of France is bald." The expression "(is) not true" used in B 2 ′ is called strong negation and is contrasted with the weak negation "(is) false".
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Its reverse will be called the strong truth predicate (or: determinate truth); it is defined in the next paragraph.
Partiality as regards properties (or relations) consists in this: given W , property F can neither be possessed, nor counter-possessed, by an individual X. Consequently, the proposition that X is F is gappy in W (i.e., the property is a function that maps a given individual to such a partial proposition). Given a v which maps X to x and W to w, [F x] w thus v-constructs nothing: the construction is v-improper. Consequently, the classical laws  from the Law of Excluded Middle to De Morgan's Exchange Rule for Quantifiers  possibly involving such vimproper constructions do not hold. This is why we must amend them using the strong truth predicate which is definable by
where Tr T π /(ππ).
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Thus, if P is without a truth-value in W (the value of w on v), both P w and [∼ P w ] are v-improper, whereas [Tr T π P] w 11 Recently, several writers (e.g. [43] ) have dismissed Strawson's lesson by pointing to sentences such as "The King of France is having supper" which can't be gappy. However, the writers have neglected the intuitive fact that, though sentences governed by episodic verbs (i.e., verbs describing an action) can never lack a definite truth-value, sentences governed by attributive verbs such as '(be) bald" can. 12 The two kinds of negations has been discussed in philosophical logic and philosophy of language circles repeatedly, e.g. in [10] . 13 Cf. e.g. [30] for partiality issues and [31] for an analysis of truth in TIL. 
This method of 'correction' of partiality will only be applied to selected propositional constructions because sometimes such a correction is unnecessary (e.g., because all bottom subconstructions are already corrected), or even undesiderable. For example, the Exchange Rule for Quantifiers in a version relevant for this paper becomes
The determinateness of statements which ascribe possession of properties can be achieved by utilizing the notion of instantiation defined by
where Inst/(πι(πι)). Because of the existence of the proposition undefined for all worlds, the Exchange Rule for Modal Operators has to be amended as follows:
The firm notion of determinate truth is needed for definition of the notion of entailment. Since THL employs both intensional and hyperintensional levels, it harbours notions of entailment designated for each level.
Firstly, note that properties of constructions of certain objects 'supervene on' properties of those objects. One may therefore simply speak about properties of objects without a strict need to speak even about properties of the constructions of those objects. In consequence of this, the reader is assumed to be able to compile appropriate definitions of the notions applicable to constructions herself.
The truth where Tr P T * k /(π * k ).
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Similarly for entailment:
where π /(πππ); /(π * k * k ), which is the preferred of the two notions. Below, I will gradually omit brackets from "[C 1 C 2 ]" as well as the proper indications the particular constructions flanking have to be introduced, using 0 , as constructions per se; e.g., [ 0 P 0 Q] will be written as "P Q".
Categorical statements and their relations 3.1. Categorical statements and contradictoriness
That categorical statements can oppose each other, and that some entail some other, gives rise to the Square of Opposition; on a modern reading of the Square only some of the relations hold.
In my variant of the modern reading, specific versions of categorical statements occur. Each categorical statement is a propositional construction of the form "Q j C i ", where Q j (for 1 j 2) is ∀ or ∃ and C i (for 1 i 4) is a construction of a property. C i consists of ∧ or → and two propositional constructions. It is important that these are amended by the strong truth predicate to prevent the undesirable impact of existential import  which I am going to discuss in detail in Section 3.3. As in the familiar modern reading of the Square, my proposal does not fully preserve the traditional construal. The only important relation that obtains is contradictoriness (see Section 3.3 for more discussion).
Abbreviated form full form its usual verbal expression
A ⇔ ∀λx[(Fx) → (Gx)] Every F is G. E ⇔ ∀λx[(Fx) → ¬(Gx)] No F is G. I ⇔ ∃λx[(Fx) ∧ (Gx)] Some F is G. O ⇔ ∃λx[(Fx) ∧ ¬(Gx)] Some F is not G.
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I define it as an explicitly modal notion (similarly for subalternation, contrariety and subcontrariety):
where Contradictory/(πππ).
As mentioned in Remark 14, particular categorical statements need not use the strong truth predicate (contradictoriness and conversions/ obversions still hold). I deploy it only to achieve their closer structural similarity to universal categorical statements.
Existential import
It is well known that the modern reading of the Square does not preserve subalternation, contrariety and subcontrariety because of existential import.
Though there seems to be consensus as regards the intuitive notion, its detailed definitions vary  cf. e.g. [7, 4] (and e.g. [35, 8] , for historical issues). I am going to propose a definition that is convenient for our purposes.
The informal wording of the definition comes in two variants, i. for meanings of predicates, ii. for statements. i. A 'predicate' F (or G) has existential import in a statement P of which it is a subconstruction iff there is a world W such that if there is no instance of F in W , P is not true in W ; ii. P lacks existential import iff there is no F such that F has existential import in P.
The precise forms of the two particular definitions employ variables c and d which range over the type * k to which the constructions F (and: G) and P belong;
where
Remarks. a. Note that the definition is not limited to categorical statements. On the other hand, it defines the notion of existential import of constructions which only v-construct ι-properties for it is the only case I am interested in in this paper. The conjunct
checks' whether the value of d is a construction of a ι-property; if the checking fails, the value of d goes undecided as regards its existential import in the value of c.
To define the notion of existential import generated by meanings of (say) individual descriptions, as in "The King of France is bald", the above definition must be adapted accordingly. Such a definition may utilize the fact that constructions of ξ-objects, where ξ equals (say) ι ω , can be mapped to constructions of closely-related properties, so the above definitions can be enhanced to cover more cases of constructions. To show this, let us define the aforementioned 'normalization function' for constructions of individual offices first:
where u/ι ω ; Norm c. My definition does not implement the conviction that existential import is only caused by the 'subject' term. One reason for this consists in the fact that the notion of 'subject' is debatable. Recall the familiar fact that categorical statements are logically equivalent to their variants which contain generalized quantifiers "all", "some", "none" (cf. e.g. [25] ), which is evident from their definiens, e.g.
where All/((π(πι))(πι)). The 'subject' of [[All F] G] seems to be G, which contradicts the intuition that it is rather F, as one might have perhaps concluded when inspecting "Every F is G". Anyway, a possible restriction of my definition to 'subject' terms is easy to implement. d. Having (or: lacking of) existential import is a non-contingent property of statements: if P has existential import, it has it in every world W . Moreover, having existential import in statements is also conceived of here as a non-contingent property, though of certain parts of statements. Arguably, a contingent variant of the notion  according to which F has import only in some worlds  is intuitively admissible; but then, existential import of P would be best defined in terms of F's possibly having the existential import in P; the results of my paper thus would not change.
[
(The notion of existential import that is contingent, since a statement has such existential import dependently on given world, is extra-logical and thus not considered here.) e. Finally, note that having existential import does not amount to having existential presupposition in the sense of [37] .
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The definition of the latter notion: ∃λx[Fx] is an existential presupposition of P of which it is a subconstruction iff it is entailed ( ) by P as well as its negated form. Obviously, though ∃λx[Fx] is entailed by ∃λx[[Fx] ∧ [Gx]], i.e., I, it is not entailed by its negated form (i.e., in fact E). This means that ∃λx [Fx] is not an existential presupposition of I or its negated form, despite being I's existential consequence (since I has existential import).
Existential import of categorical statements and the Square of Opposition
Now let us examine why constructions such as
cannot 'decorate' vertices of the Square of Opposition. The reason lies in the fact that the propositional construction has existential import because F or G can have existential import in it.
As an example of F consider the property 
18 For a brief overview of the debate concerning existential presupposition and categorical statements see [4] . 19 The logical analysis of the predicate "be such an individual that is identical with the King of France" is λxλw [ 
, where King/(πιι); Fr/ι; Sng/(ι(oι)); the singularization function Sng maps each singleton to its sole member and it is undefined otherwise. The logical analysis of "be such an individual that it is true T that the individual is identical with the King of France" discussed below is λxλw[Tr
are all false (when applied to w, one gets F). They all have existential import, since F has existential import in them. Therefore, the quadruple of such statements cannot form a Square of Opposition since there is no contradictoriness relation present. One may ask why this drawback of the standard modern formalization of the categorical statements within the Square  which does not employ the strong truth predicate  has gone unnoticed.
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A very probable reason seems to be that unsatisfiable properties were ignored and/or implicitly considered in their 'definite form' such as be such an individual that it is true T that the individual is identical with the King of France which is currently counter-instantiated by all individuals. By rectifying the above quadruple of statements with explicit help of the strong truth predicate  as I propose in Section 3.1  the universal categorical statements A and E lack existential import and the quadruple forms a genuine Square of Opposition.
Let me add that to achieve subalternation of I to A some writers (e.g. [4, 35] ) endow A-statements with existential import by adding an appropriate existential statement:
The O-vertex is then 'decorated' by its negation (by application of familiar logical laws one obtains ∃λx
. The resulting Square of Opposition is indeed a possibility, but it dismisses the familiar modern reading of the Square.
Lack of subalternation, contrariety and subcontrariety of categorical statements
As is well known, the lack of existential import of the universal categorical statements A and E affects subalternation, contrariety and subcontrariety. To demonstrate this, suppose there is no F in W ; the particular categorical statements I and O are thus false in W . But A and E are true in W , not false, since modern logic treats them as lacking existential import (sections 3.1 and 3.2). Consequently,
A I E O
from which the invalidity of subalternation, contrariety and subcontrariety follow  as is easy to check. Firstly, here are definitions of the three notions:
where Subaltern, Contrary, Subcontrary/(πππ). With categorical statements at hand, we are ready to articulate modal (de dicto) categorical statements. As indicated in the introduction, they are of the form "M j P i ", where P i (for 1 i 4) is a categorical statement and M j (for 1 j 2) is or ♦.
I am going to present modal categorical statements right away with statements logically equivalent to them. These statements can perhaps be viewed as their 'intensional readings' because they employ the notion of a requisite relation which is applied to couples of properties as such. It is defined thus:
where Requisite/(π(πι)(πι)).
The 'intensional reading' is derived from Tichý's unpublished proposal 21 to read universal categorical statements such as 21 It occurred in Tichý's unpublished typescript called Introduction to Intensional Logic which was completed in 1976. In [38] , Tichý published a variant of the notion for individual offices.
"Every horse is an animal" as analytic because of the meaning connection between predicates. His motivation for the notion of requisite is this: to become a horse an individual has to be an animal, have legs, etc  the property be an animal is thus a property an individual must instantiate in order to instantiate the property be horse, while be an animal is one of its many requisites.
The notion of a requisite is correlative with the notion of entailment between properties (which was considered by e.g. Plantinga [28] ):
where Entails/(π(πι)(πι)). The entailment of a proposition Q from a proposition P , i.e., P ⊆ Q, is a medadic case of entailment between properties because in every world W the extension of F ⊆ the extension of G.
By utilizing the above definition of the notion of requisite and familiar logical laws, one gets two equivalent forms of universal modal categorical statements:
G is a requisite of F . G is not a requisite of F . expression Table 2 . Modal universal categorical statements.
To complete the quadruple of such statements one needs a notion comparable with the notion of a requisite. I call it potentiality; it is definable [33] by
where Potentiality/(π(πι)(πι)).
To explain: an individual who instantiates the property be a horse has to be an animal, while be a horse admits the individual being white or being a champion, etc. The properties be white and be a champion are thus potentialities of be a horse. On the other hand, the meaning of the predicate "be a horse" excludes to affirm truly that a horse is a cat, i.e., be a cat is not a potentiality of be a horse.
Note that the disjunction of the notions of potentiality and its negated form is a requisite of a given property. For example, be a champion or not a champion is a requisite of the property be a horse, while both be a champion and be not a champion are its potentialities.
G is a potentiality of F . G is not a potentiality of F . expression Table 3 . Modal particular categorical statements. Legend: the dotted line indicates that the relation of contrariety/subcontrariety does not hold, the dashed line indicates that the relation of subalternation holds with an exception, the full line indicates that the relation of contradictoriness holds; cf. Section 4.5 for discussion of the relations.
The Square of Opposition with modal categorical statements
This Square enables us to quickly find relations that obtain between modal categorical statements and also between statements about requisites, potentialities, non-requisites and non-potentialities.
Note that this Square differs from the ancient 'modal' Square of Opposition attributed to Aristotle ( [1] , cf. also e.g. [13] ) which concerns four statements of form "M i P ", where M i (for 1 i 4) is (the meaning of) "necessarily", "possibly", "not necessarily", "not possibly". So the four statements share one and the same non-modal categorical statement P . In the 'modal' Square I propose, however, each statement M j P i (for 1 j 2 and 1 i 4) contains one of the four non-modal categorical statements P i .
Moreover, all modal categorical statements of the above Square can be converted to their equivalent variants involving the notions of requisite and potentiality (cf. Section 4.1). After such a conversion we still have a genuine square, though not with modals. On the other hand, it is difficult to find such equivalent variants of statements such as "It is possible that no F is G" of the ancient 'modal' Square. The two 'modal' Squares are clearly different.
Requisite/potentialities vs. essential/accidental properties
There is an obvious nexus between requisites and potentialities on the one hand and essential and accidental properties on the other, since the latter notions are likewise definable in terms of necessity and possibility. One may therefore ask whether statements such as a.
′′′
"Being descended from apes is/is not essential for humans" b.
"Being descended from apes is/is not accidental for humans" can have existential import.
This has relevance even beyond purely modal discourse. As proved by Corcoran (e.g. [7] ), the notion of A-statement in the modern reading is not completely devoid of existential import: A does entail ∃λx [Fx] provided ∃λx[Fx] is logically true. Though Corcoran did not say it, the existential statement is only logically true if F is essential for certain x. To elucidate this, I am going to define the notion of property essential for something which differs from that of essential property. The notion gets rid of Aristotelian essentialism; on the other hand, it covers even essential properties that are not as dull as the property be self-identical is.
Firstly note that the notions of essential property and accidental property overlap. For instance, be as tall as Madonna is surely a contingent property: every individual instantiates it only accidentally, except the famous pop star, since it is essential for her. I will call such properties accidental-essential properties. 22 Setting apart accidentalessential properties, one then obtains purely essential properties (e.g. be self-identical, be identical with Madonna) and purely accidental properties (e.g. be a horse).
A quadruple of comparable notions is completed by adding the notion of void properties which are properties having no instance in every world W .
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Examples of void properties are: i. be non-self-identical, ii. be a man or not a man. i. is the only property whose constant extension is the total empty class. ii. has a variable range of extensions while each is an empty partial class  if an individual is (say) a quark in W , it instantiates neither the property be a man, nor be not a man (not to be confused with the property be a non-man), 24 since the two properties have among their requisites the property (say) be an animal, which is a non-potentiality of be a quark.
Here are definitions (adapted from [29] ): where EssFor (essential for), AccFor (accidental for), Ess (essential), Acc (accidental), PurAcc (purely accidental), PurEss (purely essential) AccEss (accidental-essential), Void/(π(πι)).
Requisites and potentialities are definable (with some caution) in terms of properties essential or accidental for someone. Our findings 22 The notion was proposed by Cmorej [6] ; I use a slightly different definition and name. The notion should not be confused with Loux's [18] notion of an impure property, i.e., a property F such that an object X is F whenever X stands in a relation R to some object Y . The property live when Madonna sings seems to be an example; however, it is not accidental-essential, since it is essential for nobody. 23 The notion of void property is formally defined below. It should not be confused with the notion of an empty property which determines (a set of) properties that have empty extensions in given W : 
Usual lack of existential import
By utilizing modal categorical statements one immediately resolves the well-known puzzle according to which some intuitive A-and O-statements lack existential import. Consider the sentence "Every unicorn is a beast."
It is natural to understood it as saying that certain property is a requisite of another property. Regardless of the existence of unicorns, it is true in every W , and so it lacks existential import. It is thus adequate to parse it not as A-statement, but as A M -statement. As regards sentences such as "Some unicorn is not a beast" they are false in every W , since unicorns are, per definition, beasts. It is thus likewise natural to read it as an O M -statement. On this reading, the sentence is false not because of existential import (though it has existential import if read as an O-statement).
From such examples one might perhaps conclude that no modal categorical statement has existential import. This is nearly the case. The exception to the rule concerns mainly I M -statements that employ void properties. For example, the I M -statement "Possibly, some non-self-identical individual is G" is false because of the existential import of the term "non-self-identical individual" in the embedded I-statement, and so also in the whole I My construal of existential import follows the approach of modern logic and so universal categorical statements, whose enhanced versions have been proposed in Section 3.1, lack existential import. In Section 3.2, I discussed the details; and in Section 3.4, I restated the much-discussed lack of subalternation, contrariety and subcontrariety in the modern reading of the Square of Opposition. It is needless to stress that contradictoriness holds in it, as well as in its modal version, since no Square would be a Square of Opposition without contradictoriness.
As regards modal categorical statements  precisely formulated in Section 4.1  so-called void properties bring existential import to their particular affirmative and negative versions (Section 4.4). They are the only properties which invalidate subalternation; in consequence of this, contrariety and subcontrariety do not generally hold in the corresponding Square of Opposition (Section 4.5).
The fact that void properties make the only exception to a lack of existential import for modal particular categorical statements has a remarkable connection: weakened modes of syllogisms, e.g. Darapti "All H are G", "All H are F " / "Therefore, some F are G" are nearly generally valid on the modal reading of categorical statements which are involved in these schemes. There is a hypothesis, not examined here, that medieval logicians, who accepted the weakened modes, purposely ignored void properties because the properties simply never have instances. The investigation of a modal syllogistic that would utilize results of this paper is a task for future.
